Food for Thought #1: Tolerance and Autonomy
The duty of toleration is an aspect of the ideal of autonomy.
This is the first installment of a series of short essays that attempt to explain an aspect of a philosophical topic that is (hopefully) relevant to your everyday life. Enjoy.
Freedom and liberty require autonomy, the idea that individuals are the authors of their lives—that people control and fashion their lives through successive, freely chosen decisions. Autonomy is often characterized as either positive or negative. Negatively, it is freedom from constraint and obstacles, usually of external origin. Positively, it is the freedom to do and act, to take control of one’s life. Autonomy is conditional. To be autonomous, certain conditions must be met; these include options, capabilities, capacities, and knowledge. Regardless of your predilection for positive or negative liberty, they both require choices, which will be the focus of this essay.
For autonomy to be present, any array of options will not suffice; an adequate range must be available. A choice between good and evil is no choice, nor is the choice between death and survival. Autonomy requires a choice of goods and cannot be achieved while fighting for one’s physical or moral survival, nor can it be achieved through coercion.
Imagine choosing your life was like checking out a book at your local library. A library that carries only Merriam-Webster dictionaries does not offer an adequate range of options, nor would it if it carried a multitude of distinct dictionaries. It must carry various books from multiple genres to be considered sufficient. One book per genre will not suffice, for books of the same genre can be written in drastically different styles.
In the same way, an autonomous life cannot be achieved if the only option at one’s disposal is evangelism, nor if every option is some sect of Christianity or religious life. Various forms of life with distinct and incompatible virtues must be obtainable and vary in their object and means—vigorous and apathetic, brave and cowardly. A life of contemplation is distinct from a life of action, both of which can be carried out with distinct styles. A commitment to the ideal of autonomy entails a commitment to moral pluralism.
Moral pluralism is the view that there are various forms and styles of life which exemplify different virtues and which are incompatible. Forms or styles of life are incompatible if, given reasonable assumptions about human nature, they cannot normally be exemplified in the same life.1
Autonomy presupposes conflicting considerations and trade-offs between morally incompatible and distinct forms of life, the pursuit of which precludes others. This includes forms of life that inculcate virtues that tend to encourage the intolerance of other forms of life. Referring to my example, a library cannot remove its poetry section simply because poetry snobs are likely to be intolerant of science fiction fans. Conflict of this sort is inherent to a society that values and promotes the ideal of autonomy. Thus, the need for tolerance arises, which relies on four features.
First, only behaviour which is either unwelcome to the person towards whom it is addressed or behaviour which is normally seen as unwelcome is intolerant behaviour. Secondly, one is tolerant only if one inclines or is tempted not to be. Thirdly, that inclination is based on dislike or antagonism to the behaviour, character, or some feature of the existence of its object. Finally, the intolerant inclination is in itself worthwhile or desirable.2
Finding a way of life morally repugnant is not a sufficient reason to snuff it out in a society that upholds the ideal of autonomy. Indeed, within bounds, the ideal of autonomy requires protecting an adequate range of morally distinct forms of life, of which repugnant forms have their place due to the inevitability of conflict between competing and incompatible virtues. Religious men have no right to eradicate queer forms of life. Just as gay men have no right to eliminate religious forms of life, no matter how intolerant or morally reprehensible they may appear to each other.
But how should a tolerant society handle intolerant people? To what extent does tolerance demand intolerance of the intolerant? The paradox of tolerance appears to be that drawing the boundary of toleration creates intolerance—anything outside the boundary must not be tolerated. Is there a way out of this paradox? Let me know what you think. Leave a comment below.
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Joseph Raz, “Autonomy, toleration, and the harm principle,” in Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 159.
Ibid., 163.